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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martínez reviews classical and contemporary work on 
a fortiori arguments, or arguments based on ‘more or less,’ examining the conception, uses and 
how to evaluate a fortiori arguments. If you have heard of a short song, “Everything you can do I 
can do better, everything you can do I can do too,” the lyrics captures key elements of a fortiori 
argument. In the argument, two cases A and B are compared, A has attribute x, so B should/must 
have the same attribute x. How much light has she shed on this argument is the main focus of 
this commentary. In this commentary, I will briefly summarize Martínez’ paper, draw our 
attention to the strengths and then room for improvement. 
 
2. Summary of the paper 
 
In section 2 of her paper, Martínez draws on Rieke, Sillars and Peterson’s Argumentation and 
Critical Decision Making and emphasizes the use of a fortiori argument in two phases of 
decision-making process. It clarifies contexts in which a fortiori argument is used. In her 
understanding, decision-making or deliberation seems to be an important situation in which 
people use this argument type. 
 The third section of the paper draws on contemporary work by Marrud and Wiseman, and 
defines this argument type as a “comparative” argument, and lays out its structure. In Martínez’ 
words, it can be put in the MP-mp-conclusion structure as follows: 
 
Major Premise (the comparative one): A is more/less than B, A has property x, 
(which include or exclude) B. 
minor premise: A is / has property x 
conclusion: a fortiori (with more reason) B is / has property (or not) x (Martínez, 
p. 5) 
 
From a pragmatic view, different uses of this argument type are for (1) determining the degree of 
possession of a predicate by contrasting two ore more subjects/things/events, (2) strengthening a 
position, (3) examining the plausibility of award of a characteristic or property, (4) ranking the 
best examples of a class or category, and (5) helping to resolve dispute between two values or 
alternatives. 
 The fourth section of this paper turns our attention to the work of Aristotle and examines 
the issue of predication, linking it with Aristotle’s categories of accident, property, genre and 
definition. Also, Martínez informs us of three different ways of presenting comparative 
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superiority of two options: addition, extension, and subtraction. Based on these two sections, the 
fifth section introduces five cases of a fortiori arguments: 
 
Case 1: whether John should give a diamond or a gold necklace as a present from 
to Mary 
Case 2: whether a company renews its machinery for improvement of production 
Case 3: whether a company reduces its employees to reduce the risk of 
bankruptcy 
Case 4: from which bank a person should get mortgage 
Case 5: what would constitute quality of a good husband 
 
The final section six of the paper uses the same examples and tackles the issue of evaluation of 
these examples. With five sections, Martínez offers conception, different uses, classical roots, 
examples, analysis and evaluative framework of a fortiori argument type. 
 
3. Strengths and room for improvement 
 
One general strength of Martínez’ paper is its broad-ranging coverage of a fortiori argument type. 
Not only does it offer a conception and different uses of this argument type based on 
contemporary and classical literature, but covers other issues such as analysis and evaluation. 
With this paper she has started a good research program on this specific argument type. 
 Another strength of Martínez’ paper lies in sections three and four and, where Martínez 
offers a conception and different uses of a fortiori argument type based on contemporary 
literature and historicize it with classical literature of Aristotle’s Topica and On Rhetoric. Going 
back to the classical literature and ‘re-’discovering the key elements of the argument type can 
sometimes lead to better understanding of the research topic. In her paper, she links the topic 
with Aristotle’s categories of accident, property, genre and definition, as well as three ways of 
showing superiority between two competing propositions/positions: addition, extension and 
subtraction. While there could be more ways of showing comparative superiority or inferiority, 
offering these three based on Aristotle’s work helps us see clear ways for comparison. Another 
strength is example a fortiori argument for analysis and evaluation. These examples collectively 
link historical and contemporary theoretical accounts of a fortiori arguments and actual practices 
of the argument-making. 
 Two general suggestions that I make for improving Martínez’ paper are substance and 
form of the paper. As regards the substance, two comments center on conception and 
classification of, as well as synthesis of different approaches to this argument type. 
 First, as I have sensed in my first exposure to the paper, and as it became clear during the 
discussion of this paper at the conference, Martínez must offer a clear map surrounding this 
argument type, with reference to a priori analogy argument and causal argument. As she presents 
in section two of the paper, a typical example includes some comparison between two cases, like 
the one between animals and humans in discussing respectful and considerate treatment of both. 
If rights of humans precede those of animal and if A (animals) have property x (right to 
respectful and considerate treatment), then it follows a fortiori that B (humans) (ought to) have 
the same property. Comparing two similar cases and drawing a conclusion are key features of a 
priori analogy, as several works by Trudy Govier have shown. In addition, case 4 of this paper 
suggests that a person should get a mortgage from a bank with lower interest rate. This example 
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seems to suggest a causal argument that compares relative consequential benefit because of 
different interest rates. I do not mean that these two examples undermine what she advances. 
However, the onus is on the author of the paper to make clear distinctions among these similar 
argument types because different argument type may well require different analytical and 
evaluative frameworks. 
 Another room for improvement in the substance of this paper lies in the synthesis of 
different approaches to this argument type. In short, I would like her to weave different 
literature/schools of thought together. If I make a list of people she draws on: Rieke and Sillars 
from speech communication and debate tradition, Marraud, Wiseman, and Macagno & Walton 
from contemporary argumentation studies, Aristotle or Quintilian from classical Greek and Latin 
traditions, Eemeren from Pragma-Dialectical school of argumentation. The broad-ranging 
literature she cites individually and collectively shows us the significance of the research topic. 
However, if Martínez treats one school of thought in one section of paper and moves on to 
another school in another section without clearly relating them together, the readers may be left 
to question how and in what respect these different ideas are weaved to make a whole story about 
a fortiori argument type. Rieke and Sillars, and Eemeren are key figures for showing a use of this 
argument type in deliberation and decision-making in section two of the paper. Eemeren is also 
important in evaluating biased and unbiased uses of this argument type with a theoretical 
construct of strategic maneuvering in section six of this paper. Using Pragma-Dialectical theory 
of argumentation for evaluation seems to imply that the author is committed to evaluate this 
argument type as a violation of their procedural rules or rhetorical contextual factors such as 
language or audience. However, turning our eyes to section three and four, she draws on Marraud, 
Wiseman, Macagno and Walton, and Aristotle in analyzing a fortiori argument as product. These 
two approaches toward evaluation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but she could have 
constituted a better whole by synthesizing these different approaches. 
 Given Martínez’ educational affiliation with logic and philosophy of science, my 
suggestion to evaluation is to bring the logical tradition to the fore and to talk more about a 
fortiori argument type as a product of argument, and use Pragma-Dialectical theory as a heuristic 
tool to call our attention to certain contextual elements in actual cases. This may not satisfy 
Pragma Dialecticians, but what is more important to her project is to provide a better account of 
a fortiori argument types in terms of conception, analysis, different uses in different contexts, and 
biased and unbiased ways of using this argument type.  
 The final suggestion for improving this paper concerns the form of presenting Martínez’ 
ideas. Every time she presents five cases in section five of this paper, she uses a table to show 
relative merits of two or three competing options. For example, when she presents case 1, in 
which John decides which jewels he gives to Mary—a diamond or a gold necklace, she lists a 
table showing two options (a diamond and a gold necklace), and accompanying number with 
which she intends to show relative merits. However, I am left to wonder what these numbers are. 
What do they represent? How has the author come up with these numbers? If these numbers are 
‘objective’ and ‘unbiased,’ what roles does evaluation of argumentation have? Providing more 
detailed explanation about these points will easily answer my questions, but the onus is on the 
author of the paper to develop her points much more in detail. 
 While I am a bit confused about some ways that Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martínez 
presents her ideas, she has done a really nice job to call this community’s attention to a fortiori 
argument type, paving a way to bridge logical, communicative, and dialectical approach to 
arguments. I would like her to pursue this route and fully develop her ideas, so that we can better 
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understand conception, analysis, evaluation, and different uses of this argument type. 
